Research

Published:

Dasgupta, Aditya and Daniel Ziblatt. 2015. How did Britain Democratize? Views from the Sovereign Bond MarketThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 75 (1): pp.1-29. [replication data]

To assess competing theories of democratization, we analyze British sovereign bond market responses to the Great Reform Acts.

Dasgupta, Aditya, Kishore Gawande, and Devesh Kapur. 2017.  (When) Do Anti-poverty Programs Reduce Violence? India’s Rural Employment Guarantee and Maoist Conflict. International Organization. Vol. 71 (3): pp.605-32. [replication data]

Drawing on a policy experiment, we demonstrate that anti-poverty programs can mitigate civil conflict, but also highlight the role of state capacity in shaping these effects.

Working Papers:

Voice in a Clientelist System: How Civically Engaged Communities Succeed in Distributive Politics. [Ideas for India] [আনন্দবাজার ] [IGC Blog] R&R, American Journal of Political Science

This paper argues that access to government programs and services requires both top-down connection to the ruling party as well as bottom-up civic engagement.

Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India. R&R, American Political Science Review

Can technological change contribute to political turnover? This paper investigates a large-scale historical natural experiment: the impact of the green revolution.

Divergent Paths: Democratic and Financial Development in the Nineteenth Century (with Daniel Ziblatt).

We examine the reaction of the nineteenth century sovereign bond market to the rise of mass suffrage in Europe and the Americas.

The Curse of Strong Roots in Party Collapse: Evidence from India’s Green Revolution.

How do established parties collapse? This paper offers a historical and institutional answer, highlighting an organizational “curse of strong roots”.

When Voters Reward Enactment But Not Implementation: Evidence from the World’s Largest Social Program. [India in Transition]

This paper provides evidence that voters employ a heuristic that rewards the enactment of new programs to a greater extent than quality of implementation.

In-progress:

The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Effectiveness: Evidence from Local Rural Development Officials in India (with Devesh Kapur)

We unpack the black box of state capacity by conducting a nationwide survey and time-use analysis of front-line rural development bureaucrats across India.

A Behavioral Measure of Local State Capacity. (with Devesh Kapur, Mark Schneider and Milan Vaishnav)

We construct an experimental measure of district-level state capacity based on postal delivery times and rates.